PORT STATE CONTROL:
STRONG MEDICINE TO CURE A SICK INDUSTRY
John Hare
[* This article first appeared in Volume
26, Issue 3 of the Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law - Special Admiralty Issue, (1997) and is
re-printed by permission.]
Preface
In a previous article dealing with flag,
coastal and port state control [1], I
suggested that the shipping industry was closing the net on
unseaworthy ships and their unscrupulous owners. At that
time, in early 1994, I shared the shipping industry's
hesitancy to acclaim the success of port state control
measures which were burgeoning around the maritime states of
the world. There are now positive indications that port state
control is proving more effective than even its most ardent
early proponents would have hoped.
"Port State Control" as a
concept, involves the powers and concomitant obligations
vested in, exercised by, and imposed upon a national maritime
authority (or its delegee) by international convention or
domestic statute or both, to board, inspect and where
appropriate detain, a merchant ship flying a flag foreign to
that state in order to ensure compliance by that ship with
all applicable international safety at sea instruments and
with any domestic legislative maritime safety requirements.
This article will seek to explore the legal
basis of international port state control and the manner in
which it has matured over the past fifteen years into what
has demonstrably become the most effective cure of the
malaise of the maritime industry.[ 2]
In focusing on the legality and operation
of port state control, one should however remain conscious of
the fact that it is but one of a compendium of three prime
jurisdictions which have a collective responsibility to
ensure the maintenance of standards at sea; the first is flag
state control by which is meant the international and
domestic powers and obligations of a state which allows
vessels to register under its flag. The birth of port state
control is probably to be found in the failure of the
majority of flag states (certainly by volume of tonnage
registered) properly to carry out their responsibilities in
administering their ships registers.[3]
The second of the control measures is the
jurisdiction of a coastal state to police the use of
its waters by foreign tonnage. This jurisdiction, and its
limitations and inadequacies, was also examined in my earlier
article.[4]
Port state control as the third
jurisdictional regime, should therefore not be viewed in
isolation from its two counterparts. But the time has clearly
been reached where the maritime industry can embrace and
applaud port state control as having been largely
instrumental in bringing the industry back from the brink of
disgrace upon the edge of which it was surely teetering at
the beginning of this decade.
The nature and origins of port
state control
The concept of a state exercising its
jurisdiction over ships that ply its waters and particularly
those that call at its ports, is well established in both
history and legal practice.
It is universally acknowledged that once a
ship voluntarily enters port it becomes fully subject to the
laws and regulations prescribed by the officials of that
territory for events relating to such use and that all types
of vessels, military and other, are in common expectation
obliged to comply with the coastal regulations about proper
procedures to be employed and permissible activities within
internal waters.[5]
But the practice of the majority of ports,
at least until the last decade, was to give scant inspection
to calling vessels. A pilot may well have checked whether the
vessel was loaded below her marks, but even this was
circumvented by the not uncommon but immensely dangerous
practice of 'hogging' a ship to bend her load line above the
water line. Maritime authorities were concerned almost
exclusively with the affairs of their own ships (and then
often in a far too lackadaisical manner). With the growth of
flags of convenience -- many of whose maritime authorities
turned a blind eye to the condition of the vessels whose fees
they so readily received -- with the lack of interest by port
authorities, and with the inadequacies of general coastal
state policing of passing ships, the unseaworthy ship
(euphemistically referred to 'sub-standard') abounded. That
this slide was hastened by the general decline in world trade
in the late 1970's, particularly for non-containerised break
bulk cargo vessels, bulk carriers and tankers, cannot be
denied. Surplus and superannuated tonnage long overdue for
the scrap-yard can only be used to make meagre profits in the
hands of marginal and economically stressed ship-owners.
It was in relation to oil tankers (many of
which were knocked together with undue haste in the oil boom
of the early 1970's) that the international community first
sat up and took notice that there was perhaps something
untoward going on in the shipping industry. The sad reality
of news-making is that it is often easier to galvanise public
opinion with a single photograph of three forlorn oil-soiled
penguins than with a headline recording the sinking of yet
another bulk carrier with all hands lost.
The control and prevention of oil pollution
has long occupied the minds of international maritime
legislators.[6] The chapter
of major oil tanker casualties, starting with the grounding
of the Torrey Canyon in 1967, gave a very
conspicuous public face to the vagaries of shipping and the
tragedy of what can happen when things go wrong. Less
conspicuous was the continuing appalling loss of non-tanker
merchant ships, particularly bulk carriers, which remains one
of the prime causes of concern of the shipping industry to
this day.[7]
Whilst oil pollution casualties may well
have highlighted sub-standard shipping as a green issue[8], the continuing loss of seamens' lives is the
whole nub of the issue and the catalyst that has given
strength to the arms of the ILO, the IMO and the ITF in
co-ordinating international reaction.[9]
Not that the international maritime
community had not previously sought to establish regimes for
self regulation; as early as 1876 the agitation of British MP
Samuel Plimsoll led to the UK's Merchant Shipping Act, 1876
which enshrined the requirement of a load-line for all
merchant ships. The successor to Plimsoll's Act, the present
load-line convention, is one of the package of conventions
relied on for port state control.[10]
And it was not only in relation to oil
pollution and load-lines that the maritime community
addressed issues of safety at sea. As early as 1914,
following a conference in London [11], the first
SOLAS [12] was concluded. The four
subsequent SOLAS conventions [13] have
covered most areas of maritime safety and are continually
updated under the auspices of the IMO.
Disaster begets action and remedy. It took
the loss of the Amoco Cadiz off the coast of
Britanny in 1978, with a cargo of 227 000 tons on board, to
focus the world's attention on the sea. The Amoco Cadiz
spurred the IMO [14] into
re-examining the laws of salvage -- an initiative which was
then taken over by the CMI [15] in the
preparation of the draft Montreal Salvage Convention which in
turn led to the 1989 London Convention on salvage. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the
international conventions which impact upon the safety of
ships at sea. Suffice to state that collectively, as will be
pointed out below, they provide the framework for port state
control inspections, and without them, and the considerable
labours that preceded their conclusion, port state control
would have as little direction as it would have teeth.
The role of international
organisations
As has been alluded to above, the ILO and
the ITF have played significant roles in applying pressure
upon maritime states to apply relevant safety conventions and
regimes. The CMI has also played its part in addressing
salvage and safety issues. But it is upon the IMO that
responsibility for the drawing up and implementation of
safety standards became focused. The IMO, then as IMCO, was
established by UN resolution in 1948, and the 1948 SOLAS
convention which followed, took heart from the fact that for
the first time there was to be a permanent international
authority which could lobby for and enact international
conventions to regulate shipping. The IMO, especially during
the 1950s, played a leading role in the preparation of UNCLOS
[16]. It has since sponsored and spearheaded the
various subsequent SOLAS conventions establishing and
improving load lines, navigation, watchkeeping, building and
registration requirements of all ships.
In addition to the promotion of
international conventions, the IMO passes its own assembly
resolutions which in turn bind the member states of the IMO.
It is these resolutions therefore which, coupled with the
international conventions, impose obligations on port states
to exercise the controls envisaged by the resolutions.
The IMO has recently consolidated its port
state control measures.[17] The
consolidated resolution and its annexures set out the
procedures for port state control in chapter and verse.
Inspections are categorised as initial port state inspections
and then more detailed inspections. Guidelines are provided
for detention and reporting procedures
Not only do the IMO provisions require
surveys and inspections to ensure that vessels comply with
the appropriate international conventions, they also now make
it possible for port state control officers inspecting
foreign ships to check operational requirements 'when there
are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are
not familiar with essential ship board procedures relating to
the safety of ships'.[18] The
resolution makes particular reference to passenger ships and
ships which may present a special hazard. 'Clear grounds' are
defined in the Annex to the Resolution and include
operational shortcomings, cargo operations not being
conducted properly, the involvement of the ship in incidents
caused by operational mistakes, absence of an up-to-date
muster list and indications that crew members may not be able
to communicate with each other in a common language. This is
a departure from the previous constraints of port state
control inspection which was that they should normally be
limited to checking certificates and documents, the
resolution confirms that if conditions are not valid, or if
there are clear grounds (as defined) for believing that the
condition of the ship or of its equipment or of its crew are
not up to scratch, a more detailed inspection may be carried
out. There is considerable focus on the crew's ability to
carry out safety functions on board ship.
It should also be noted that the IMO plays
an active role as observer in the activities of the regional
port state control co-operation groupings referred to below.
The IMO recognises that it is not the
deliberate intent of states to allow substandard ships to
operate under their flags. Some states, particularly
developing nations with new registers, lack adequate
resources for policing their own fleet, yet alone the fleets
of other vessels calling at their ports. The IMO has assisted
greatly in training governments in improving their own
maritime inspectorates, and plays a leading role in maritime
education generally through the World Maritime University. Of
the IMO's role in relation to port state control, its current
Director, Mr William O'Neil, had the following to say on
World Maritime Day in 1996:
Shipping is an international industry
which is proud of its tradition of freedom of the seas,
but that does not mean that ships can sail wherever they
like regardless of their condition. The maritime world
has the right to expect that ships of all nations meet
the levels of safety and environmental protection which
have been internationally agreed upon. It is up to
shipowners to make sure that their ships are safe,
properly manned and do not pollute the seas and it is the
duty of governments to make sure that ships which fly
their flag comply with the standards laid down in the IMO
treaties which they have ratified. If they fail to do so,
then IMO -- which has the stewardship of these standards
-- has not only the right but the obligation to take
further action.
It is thus the IMO which is prescribing the
medicine. The IMO's medicine chest will be much strengthened
by the coming into effect of the SOLAS requirement for ISM
certification. This certification coupled with a Safety
Management System (SMS) is due to take effect on July 1st
1998 and will impose upon ship-owners definitive standards of
operation and management which will become the benchmarks
against which port state control inspectors may in the future
assess compliance.
Regional initiatives - the
Memoranda of Understanding
Crucial to the success of port state
control operations is the sharing of information gained about
particular ships or their owners and operators, between
jurisdictions in and out of which those ships trade. This for
two reasons: first, one would not like unduly to
inconvenience ships by inspecting them at each and every
port; and second, to give forewarning to maritime states of
the delinquents in their midst. The establishment of regional
initiatives in which states are tied together in their port
state control activities by memoranda of understanding
("MoU's"), are becoming increasingly significant
and will no doubt one day encompass most of the world's
oceans and ports. With the ease of dissemination of
information through the internet, it is also likely to become
the norm that the various regional initiatives, set up for
geographic convenience, will increasingly share each other's
databases, thereby closing the net even more effectively on
the unseaworthy ship and its unscrupulous owner seeking to
ply a trade into unsuspecting ports.
The first and perhaps most prominent of the
regional groupings is the Paris Memorandum of Understanding
which was signed in 1982.[19]
The Paris MOU was born of the December 1980
Regional European Conference on Maritime Safety which focused
upon the need to increase maritime safety, the protection of
the marine environment and the importance of improving living
and working conditions aboard ship. The green issues and the
human rights issues, at that stage still appallingly
neglected were the impetus. It is thus interesting to note
the preamble paragraphs of the MOU:
Mindful that the principle
responsibility for the effective application of standards
laid down in international instruments rests upon the
authorities of the state whose flag a ship is entitled to
fly;
Recognising nevertheless that
effective action by port states is required to prevent
the operation of sub-standard ships;
Recognising also
the need to avoid distorting competition between
ports;
Convinced of the necessity for
these purposes of an improved and harmonised system of
port state control and of strengthening co-operation and
the exchange of information.
The groundwork was laid for effective
international co-operation [20]. The key
to the Paris MOU (and indeed to others and to port state
control itself), is a requirement that each contracting state
will ensure through an effective system of port state
control, that foreign merchant ships calling in its ports,
comply with the international instruments listed in the MOU.[21]
The MOU requires each contracting
authority, within three years, to inspect an annual total of
25% of foreign merchant ships calling at its ports. And each
authority will 'consult, co-operate and exchange information'
with other authorities'. Authorities should "seek to
avoid inspecting ships which have been inspected by any of
the other authorities within the previous six months unless
they have clear grounds for inspection."[22]
The 1982 Paris MOU required that port state
control would be conducted 'without discrimination as to
flag'. It also required that each state will ensure that no
more favourable treatment is given to ships flying the flag
of a state not party to the memorandum. As will be seen
below, port state control has matured to the stage where it
now recognises the need to accept the stark reality that some
ships pose more of a problem than others: most MOUs now allow
(indeed require) discrimination upon the basis of flag, age,
type of vessel, loan owner or operator or even known
classification society.[23]
The Paris memorandum sets out detailed
guidelines as to inspection procedures and detention. The
prime purpose of detention is to ensure rectification of
defects in the vessel. Thus the Paris MOU provides [24]
In the case of deficiencies which are
clearly hazardous to safety, health or the environment,
the Authority will ... ensure that the hazard is removed
before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea.
For this purpose, appropriate action may be
taken which may include detention or stopping the ship from
continuing an operation by reason of established deficiencies
which, individually or together, would render the continued
operation hazardous. Exceptions are allowed where a ship
needs to proceed to a repair port. To prevent errant ship
owners from running a detention, the MOU stipulates that such
ships will be refused access to any port within other party
states, until the owner or operator has provided evidence of
rectification of the defects.[25]
One of the most important and effective
provisions of the Paris MOU is the obligation imposed upon
each authority to publish quarterly information about
detentions under PSC procedures. This information is required
not only to contain the name of the ship, but also the name
of her owner and operator, her flag state and her
classification society. The reasons for the detention are
then given.
Initially port states were reluctant to
publish detention information, particularly where owners were
identified. They feared a rash of damages suits by irate
ship-owners. Indeed there have been a number of protests at
the content of detention publications. But publication has in
the past three years become the norm. Let the brokers of the
world know what ships have been detained and why. Let the
world's insurers know who the miscreants are. Let the
consumer, passenger or cargo shipper, know who the
delinquents are and let them avoid using substandard ships as
an effective means of ridding the oceans of their scourge. So
comfortable have the port state authorities become with the
publication of detention lists that you will now find them
regularly in Lloyds List (UK, Australia, Canada and
the US, on a monthly basis) and even on the internet.[26] Indeed the internet is likely to be a very
valuable co-ordinating tool in the administration of port
state control procedures in the future. It is the easiest way
to access detention data bases and will certainly become the
prime means of publication of detained ships in the future.
Following the lead (and largely also the
letter) of the Paris MOU, can the Tokyo MOU for the
Asian-Pacific Region 1993,[27] The Tokyo
MOU is up-and-running although many of the participating
states have yet to establish effective port state control
facilities and procedures.
The Vina del Mar MOU, 1992, covers the
Latin American maritime authorities.[28] This MOU
recognises the objectives of a further regional maritime
co-operation scheme [29] and then
again repeats, largely to the letter, the provisions of the
Paris MOU. An interesting addition to the Vina del Mar MOU
however is Annex IV and Appendix I which seek to establish a
'Trade data interchange director' and a computer system to in
the data base records of the participating states.
The most recent port state control system
is that set up in the Caribbean on 9 February 1996 in terms
practically identical to the Paris MOU.[30] The United
Kingdom is expected to sign the MOU on behalf of its
dependent territories in the Caribbean and the MOU takes
effect upon signature of each participating country.
Other regional initiatives are on the way:
the Mediterranean region has already had preparatory
meetings, and there are discussions for West and Central
African and Persian Gulf region, piloted largely by the
Iranian Maritime Administration, for a further initiative for
an Indian Ocean rim. Clearly, the success of these regional
MOU's is interdependence upon the efforts of each other.
Domestic enabling measures
Armed with this formidable array of
international instruments and bolstered by the resolutions of
both the ILO and IMO, it is up to port states to exercise
port state control in a manner consistent with their own
domestic legislation. It is suggested that port state control
is not an option: it is, at least for parties to SOLAS,
UNCLOS, regional initiatives, and even by virtue of their
membership of the IMO alone, an obligation in international
law.
Many states have promulgated domestic
legislation to give effect to the notions of port state
control. We shall examine briefly the jurisdictions of the
USA, the UK, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand.
1) The USA
The USA has, since 1st May 1994, promoted a
rigorous and public policy of foreign vessel inspection.[31] Port state control in the USA is conducted by the
US Coast Guard (USCG), which, prior to 1994, concerned itself
mainly with limited aspects of navigation safety and
pollution prevention, particularly in relation to tanker and
passenger vessels. It was unusual for the coast guard to
intervene to enforce the compendium of international
instruments embraced by port state control.
In three years, the USCG has established a
probing port state control system over the approximately 8
000 foreign flag ships which use US ports each year. The aim
of the programme is clearly to eradicate the presence of
substandard ships in US waters [32], and to
this extent its aim parallels that of the American OPA.[33]
Legislative authority is given to the US
Coast Guard under the US Code.[34] The
chapter gives reciprocity to other parties to the SOLAS
convention, which is a step in the direction of an
international initiative which would be welcomed. The USCG
requires all vessels of 1600 GRT or more to give advanced
notice of their arrival.[35] The USCG
then checks the vessel's details against its own records and
that of its register and assigns points to each ship for
compliance with international conventions, previous track
records and those of sister ships in the same ownership or
management, and the rating of the flag and classification of
society involved. This is a clear departure from the initial
'no discrimination' provisions of early port state control
measures. Indeed the purpose of USCG port state control is to
recognise high risk vessels, their owners and their
classification societies and to take appropriate action.
Upon the points rating, the ship is then
categorised as Priority I, II or III. Priority I high risk
vessels require inspection before they are even allowed into
port limits, often at the buoys. Defects must be rectified
before the vessel enters port if at all possible.
USCG Regulations set out detailed
guidelines for port state control examinations. The proviso
is given that:
PSC examinations are not intended nor
desired to be analogous to an inspection for
certification of a US flag vessel. Rather they are
intended to be sufficient breadth and depth to satisfy a
boarding team that a vessel's major systems are in
compliance with applicable international standards and
domestic requirements, and that the crew possess
sufficient proficiency to safely operate the vessel. The
examinations are designed to determine that required
certificates are aboard and valid, and that a vessel
conforms to the conditions required for the issuance of
required certificates.
This is accomplished by a
walk-through examination and visual assessment of a
vessels relevant components, certificates and documents,
and may be accompanied by limited testing of systems and
the crew. When the examination reveals questionable
equipment, systems or crew incompetence, the boarding
team may expand the examination to conduct such
operational tests or examinations as deemed appropriate.
What is most significant about the US Coast
Guard's port state control policy, is the publication of
lists of owners & operators flag states and
classification societies which have fallen foul of USCG port
state control procedures during the past twelve months. The
USCG diligently publishes monthly detention records, giving
full details of the vessel and the defects both on its
website and in Lloyds List.[36]
Flags, owners & operators and
classification societies are assessed to help assign the
priority rating to a vessel under inspection upon the
declared policy that 'if any of these entities fails to fully
undertake its responsibilities for a ships safe operation,
then the ship is likely to be considered a sub-standard
vessel by the USCG.[37] A
percentage rating is then given to both flags and
classification societies.[38] The list
and the detention ratio is constantly updated.[39] And the flags and classification societies
themselves are categorised for priority status.[40]
2) The United Kingdom
The UK has suffered the exposure of two
major maritime casualties having a bearing on the issue of
sub-standard ships in recent times. The first was the tragic
capsizing of the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise and
the second the grounding of the tanker Braer off the
Shetland Islands in 1993. Both gave rise to extensive and
critical self examination of the UK's maritime safety
measures, and the Braer disaster led to the most
comprehensive enquiry into maritime pollution and safety yet
undertaken in the form of the 'Safer Ships Cleaner Seas
Report'.[41]
The port state control function is
deputised to the Maritime Safety Authority.[42] The MSA undertakes survey, inspection and
certification to ensure compliance with domestic and
international marine standards by both UK registered and
foreign vessels. The MSA has also recently also taken on a
public face with an internet site giving details of its
operation and publishing monthly detention lists.[43] In addition to publication its website, the MSA
publishes monthly detention lists in Lloyds List. Like the
USA, they too do not publish owners and classification
society details in Lloyds List, though such details do appear
on the website.
The UK is a party to the Paris MOU, and its
detention procedures are thus regulated the MOU and its
guidelines. UK law recognises is own inherent jurisdiction to
exercise full domestic control over foreign flag vessels
voluntarily using its ports.[44] The UK has
reportedly set itself a 30% inspection target (see the 25%
target set by the Paris MOU) and the MSA has succeeded in
achieving a target in excess of that figure. In accordance
with an agreement between the Paris MOU states,
discrimination is now allowed to pay particularly attention
to vessels considered to present special risks.[45]
That the UK is 'doing its bit' to make port
state control public and to make it work, is clear from the
review of its 1996 detentions.[46] There were
184 foreign flag detentions during the 1996 year which
reflected an overall detention rate of 8.4% of all
inspections carried out for 1996. This compares to the
detention rate of 11.6% of 1995.
It is also significant to note that five
flag states accounted for over half the ships detained. Let
us not bluff ourselves that certain registers are themselves
substandard.[47] Perhaps
Panama's situation should be viewed in the light of its
register containing the bulk of the world's merchant fleet
and with recognition of its efforts to improve the safety
record of its vessels.
3) Australia [48]
It is perhaps to Australia that one should
look for an indication of the most conspicuously effective
port state control programme. Australia too needed a
catastrophic catalyst for its maritime authorities to sit up
and take notice of the malaise which was permeating the
shipping industry by the end of the 1980s: following the loss
in relatively unexplained circumstances of six bulk carriers
off the Australian coast between January 1990 and August 1991
an enquiry was convened 'to enquire into and report on the
issue of ships safety at the national and international
level' with particular concentration on bulk carrier vessels
and foreign flag vessels plying Australian ports. The report
of chairman Peter Morris titled 'Ships of Shame' did more
perhaps to highlight the plight of the industry than any
other initiative before or since. It makes riveting and
chilling reading. It records a roll of neglect, inefficiency,
corruption and tragedy. It is sadly a roll which, although
substantially under check largely through the effectiveness
of international port state control measures, has yet to have
its last entry posted. Bulk carriers continue to sink in
unexplained circumstances with appalling loss of life. But
the port state control initiative which flowed from the
Morris Report in Australia has sent a strong message to
substandard operators to keep their ships away from
Australian waters.
Port state control in Australia is
conducted by the Australian Safety Maritime Authority (AMSA)
it to has adopted a public face and complies with its
publications to make its detentions known by publishing
monthly statistics in the local and international shipping
media and on its website.[49] As a
member of the Asia-Pacific MOU, Australia more than complies
with its 25% inspection target and in 1996 inspected 2901
vessels of which 248 were detained. Like the UK, Australia
has no qualms about publishing delinquent flags and
substandard classification societies, and these may be found
on the AMSA website on a monthly basis. The site also gives
details of detentions by ship type, an interesting addition.
The domestic legislative basis of AMSA's
inspections is found in the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912
(as amended) sec 210.[50]
In terms of that section, if it appears to
AMSA that a ship is unseaworthy or substandard, the AMSA may
order the ship to be provisionally detained, and shall
immediately give the master of the ship notice of the
provisional detention, with a statement of the grounds of the
detention. AMSA must then commission a report as to whether
the ship is unseaworthy or substandard -- a distinction which
I have previously argued should be one of semantics only. [51] The Master of the ship must be given a copy of the
report upon the strength of which a decision is taken whether
to order the ship to be finally detained; or release her
unconditionally (or on such conditions that the AMSA
considers appropriate. If an order for the final detention of
the ship is made, the ship shall not be released until AMSA
is satisfied that her further detention is no longer
necessary and orders her released.
4) South Africa
South Africa, like Australia, has for too
long been a favoured destination for unscrupulous
ship-owners. It suffers the additional risk of being on the
most economical geographical route between the west and the
east, and having a foul coastline with seasonal rough seas to
boot. It is scarcely surprising therefore that South Africa
has suffered more than its fair share of casualties, many
involving sub-standard ships. It is salutary to note that of
the world's ten largest VOC losses, the South African
coastline has hosted three -- one being the second largest
oil tanker ever lost.[52] South
Africa has sufficient domestic legislative muscle to give
full effect to port state control procedures. It has recently
brought its accession to international instruments up to
date, having become a full member of the IMO during the
course of 1996. The new South African government, shortly
after attaining power in April 1994, commission a full
enquiry into maritime transport policy including matters of
maritime safety which resulted in the publication of a white
paper in September 1996 which recognised the importance of
bolstering the SA port state control procedures.[53]
In addition to its international
obligations and their concomitant powers, South Africa's main
authority for inspection is found in the Marine Traffic Act,
1981 and the regulations published in terms of that Act.[54] South Africa is at this stage not a party to any
regional initiative but is looking both west and east to
align itself with initiatives in Latin America and in the
Indian Ocean Rim. The officials in the Department of
Transport are actively engaged in an on-going review of their
port state control capability, and international
co-operation. There is little doubt that regional initiatives
covering the oceans to the west and east of South Africa will
be formed. It would also make sense for South Africa to join
the Asia-Pacific MOU as much of its passing traffic is
destined for the Far East or Australia. It should apply for
the status of "co-operating authority" from all the
other MoU's -- not just those covering ports from which SA
trade originates: SA's geographical location makes her
particularly susceptible to passing tramp shipping from any
part of the world.
South Africa has however a long road to
travel to reach internationally accepted levels of
inspection: owing to under-manning, the current overall
inspection rate is below 5% although a higher percentage is
achieved for bulk carriers and other high risk vessels. It is
to be hoped that the initiative to form a South African
Maritime Safety Authority [55] to which
most of the maritime powers of the Ministry of Transport are
to be delegated, will vastly improve South Africa's port
state control focus and capability. It is an initiative which
deserves the highest priority in the wake of the continued
presence of substandard vessels in South African ports.[56] It is envisaged that SAMSA could be in operation
by the beginning of October 1997.
5) New Zealand [57]
South Africa has taken much encouragement
for the proposed establishment of its semi-privatised,
fee-levying safety authority from the successful
metamorphosis of New Zealand's state maritime transport
authority. In 1994 New Zealand vested most state maritime
authority in its newly established Maritime Safety Authority.[58]
New Zealand Maritime Transport Act, 1994,
empowers the authority to detain any ship and impose
conditions for its release inter alia where the
"operation or use of (the ship) endangers or is likely
to endanger any person or property, or is hazardous to the
health of safety of any person"; or where "the
appropriate prescribed maritime document is not for the time
being in force in respect of the ship, or the master of any
member of the crew of that ship."
There is a more general ground for the
exercise of powers where "the Director is satisfied, on
clear grounds, that the master is not, or crew are not,
familiar with essential shipboard procedures for the safe
operation of the ship."[59]
New Zealand, like Australia, has taken
steps to absolve port state control officials from liability
for actions taken in good faith.[60]
As has been seen above, New Zealand is a
party to the Asia-Pacific MoU, 1993.
Appeal Procedures, Costs and
Wrongful Detention
If there is an Achilles heel in current
international port state control practice it is that
authorities may be concerned by their possible exposure to
actions for wrongful detention where a ship is detained for
what subsequently and in retrospect turns out to be
insufficient cause. If a chartered vessel is facing
cancellation dates and is unable to complete loading or
discharge by reason of a port state control detention, her
owners would clearly suffer considerable financial losses.
These losses may be mirrored down the charter party chain,
and could be compounded by publicised allegations that the
owner's hitherto good trading name has been tarnished.
In most jurisdictions, the actions of port
state authorities, which are required by the MoU's to have
either direct or delegated state powers [61], would be
treated as the actions of the state and would be subject to
ordinary administrative review procedures. The regional MoU's
provide appeal procedures.[62] And some
countries provide specific appeal procedures in their
domestic enabling legislation.[63]
But what of the actions of the officials
concerned, and of the liability of the authorities as their
employers? Port state inspectors are required by the MoU's
and by the IMO to be vested with delegated state powers.
Being state employees, inspectors and their authority
employers could find their actions under the same scrutiny as
applied to an arrest of persons without good cause.[64]
Both the Australian and the New Zealand
domestic legislation have taken a proactive stance in
relation to liability of their port state control officers:
the Australian Commonwealth Navigation Act, 1912 contains
recent amendments which absolve officials from liability for
'anything done under the provisions of (the Navigation Act)
unless direct proof of corruption or malice be given'. [65]
The New Zealand statute absolves members
and employees of the authority from personal liability for
acts done "in good faith in pursuance or intended
pursuance of the functions or powers of the authority or of
the Director".[66]
It is suggested that to give full effect to
port state control, all states should follow the Australian
and New Zealand leads and enact an indemnification of
officials for actions taken in good faith. The Australian
requirement that "corruption or malice" must be
proved in order to found the claim makes sense: to allow
damages to be claimed against the port state control
authority because good cause is not subsequently shown with
the wisdom of hindsight would unduly inhibit port state
control. If a few ships are detained for insufficient reason
and commercial losses are suffered thereby, it would be a
small price to pay to ensure the efficacy of port state
control and its resultant saving of life and property.
The costs of port state control inspections
are borne by the port state authority, although it has become
relatively common practice for states to levy a maritime
safety charge upon vessels calling at their ports. Thus for
example, the various maritime safety authorities are able to
fund their operations to an extent on the "user
pays" principle. Once a vessel is detained for
non-compliance however, provision is usually made for all
costs to be borne by the ship-owner.[67]
The measure of success
How does one measure the success of an
international initiative such as port state control? Ideally,
the first prize would be a significant drop in the number of
seamen's lives lost at sea owing to the foundering of their
ships. Sadly we are not yet seeing such tangible results. The
losses continue, apparently unabated. Particularly of obo's
and other bulk carriers which, having endured a long and
hard-working life loading and carrying unforgiving cargoes
such as iron ore, are then extended into overtime by marginal
operators who can only afford minimum maintenance and below
basic crew wages.
The Institute of London Underwriters'
monthly casualty returns [68] almost
each month record another bulker lost at sea with all hands. [69] On the positive side, there is a trend emerging
which shows at least a levelling out of losses: The
Institute's confirmed total losses for each year were 1993
(140 ships); 1995 (112 ships); 1996 (111 ships). 1997 saw 20
ships lost in January and February alone.
But there is little doubt that those
jurisdictions who are taking their Port State Control
obligations seriously (and who are fortunate enough to have
the means to do so) are narrowing the trading options of the
substandard ship. The new STCW provisions [70], the ISM standards [71] and novel
and necessary measures such as ship identification devices
similar to those employed on aircraft which coastal and port
states are now authorised by IMO resolution to make
mandatory, are all an indication that the maritime industry
is taking the problem seriously.
Of Australia, once a favoured destination
for sub-standard ships, and of the US (both of whose programs
are relatively new) Lloyds List editor recently wrote:
You would have to be mad or terminally
ignorant to fix a marginal ship out of an Australian
port, and if you have an oil cargo to ship to the US you
would need quality tonnage operated by demonstrably high
quality managers.[72]
The New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority
seems to be getting a similar message across. And the ITF
earlier this year embarked on a program of targetting certain
European ports to ensure that calling vessels demonstrated
required safety standards. The ITF's campaign against flags
of convenience, waged for over 40 years, has surely
reinforced the message. The ITF's battle is not just against
unfair wage and labour conditions: it aims to root out flags
of convenience and the substandard ships they so often allow.[73]
Conclusion
Port state control internationally has come
of age. With its roots founded in necessity bred of
successive maritime casualties, it has come into its own as the
most effective means of ridding the world's ports and oceans
of sub-standard, unseaworthy and dangerous ships. This is not
to say that international pressure on flag states, owners and
classification societies to do their jobs properly and
responsibly should be in any way relaxed: but the reality
remains that there are good and bad ship-owners. There are
good and bad classification societies. And there are good and
bad ship registers. Let the international message of port
state control be loud and clear: bad ships, bad owners, bad
flag states and bad classification societies are pariahs for
which there should be no place in the shipping industry of
the future.
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Page created 16 February,
1998